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INTRODUCTION

Even after two restatements' and decades of scholarship, 2 courts remain baffled about whether strict liability should apply to commercial sellers of used products.3
The minority of courts still impose strict liability on "regular" usedgoods sellers. 4 The minority rule presumes that consumers expect equivalent safety from new and used products, and that used and new product sellers can equally pressure manufacturers to make safer products.5
Yet, the majority of courts do not impose strict liability on a commercial used-goods seller if it sold the product in the same condition as when

1.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB.
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).

§ 8 (1998);

RESTATEMENT

2.
See, e.g., William A. Dreier, The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability and New Jersey Law-Not Quite Perfect Together, 50 RUTGERS L. REV. 2059 (1998);
Robert D. Klein, A Comparison of the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability and

the Maryland Law of Products Liability, 30 U. BALT. L. REv. 273 (2001); Joel H. McNatt,
Oklahoma Manufacturers' Products Liability: Engaging ParticularWho, What, and How
Restatement (Third) Issues, With a Little Help from Ay Friends, 28 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV.
385 (2003); Steven J. Christiansen, Comment, Used Productsand StrictLiability: A Practical Approach to a Complex Problem, 1981 BYU L. REV. 154 (1981); David B. Goodwin,
Note, Protecting the Buyer of Used Products: Is Strict Liability for Commercial Sellers
Desirable?, 33 STAN. L. REV. 535 (1981); Paul W. Hahn, Note, Consumer Protection:
Should it Mandate Extension of Section 402A to Used Products Dealers?, 50 Mo. L. REv.
186 (1985); Gary J. Highland, Note, Sales of Defective Used Products:Should Strict Liability Apply?, 52 S. CAL. L. REV. 805 (1979); William L. Humes, Note, The Application of
Strict Liability in Tort to the Retailers of Used Products:A Proposal,16 OKLA. CITY U. L.
REV. 373 (1991); Lora L. Van Dyke, Note, Crandell v. Larkin & Jones: Products Liability
for Used Products Vendors in South Dakota, 29 S.D. L. REV. 181 (1983); Derrick Williams,
Note, Secondhand Jurisprudence in Need of Legislative Repair: The Application of Strict
Liability to CommercialSellers of Used Goods, 9 TEx. WESLEYAN L. REv. 255 (2003).
3.
See generally Tracy A. Bateman, Annotation, ProductsLiability: Application of
Strict Liability Doctrine to Seller of Used Product, 9 A.L.R.5th 1 (1993 & Supp. 2009)
(noting the severe split across courts nationally).
4.
See, e.g., Galindo v. Precision Am. Corp., 754 F.2d 1212 (5th Cir. 1985); Gonzalez v. Rutherford Corp., 881 F. Supp. 829 (E.D.N.Y. 1995); Stillie v. AM Int'l, Inc., 850
F. Supp. 960 (D. Kan. 1994); Jordan v. Sunnyslope Appliance Propane & Plumbing Supplies, Co., 660 P.2d 1236 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983); Stanton v. Carlson Sales, Inc., 728 A.2d 534
(Conn. Super. Ct. 1998); Turner v. Int'l Harvester Co., 336 A.2d 62 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law
Div. 1975); Frey v. Harley Davidson Motor Co., Inc., 734 A.2d 1, 19 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999);
Hovenden v. Tenbush, 529 S.W.2d 302 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975); Thompson v. Rockford
Mach. Tool, Co., 744 P.2d 357 (Wash. Ct. App. 1987); Nelson v. Nelson Hardware, Inc.,
467 N.W.2d 518 (Wis. 1991); see also 2 OWEN ET AL., MADDEN & OWEN ON PRODUCTS
LIABILITY § 20:5 (3d ed. 2008). For further discussion of the minority rule, see infra notes
146-88 and accompanying text.
5.
See supra note 4.
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the seller acquired it. 6 The majority rule recognizes that consumers expect
diminished quality and safety from used products, and that strict liability
would not pressure manufacturers to improve product safety because usedgoods sellers are usually so far removed from the initial chain of distribution that they cannot communicate product safety improvements to manufacturers.7 Thus, the majority rule concludes it would be unfair to impose a
"special responsibility" on used-product sellers to stand behind goods that
they did not design or manufacture.8 This contentious issue remains open 9
or unresolved l in many jurisdictions.
See, e.g., King v. Damiron Corp., 113 F.3d 93 (7th Cir. 1997); Harber v. Altec
6.
Indus., Inc., 812 F. Supp. 954 (W.D. Mo. 1993), affid, 5 F.3d 339 (8th Cir. 1993); Kodiak
Elec. Ass'n, Inc. v. DeLaval Turbine, Inc., 694 P.2d 150 (Alaska 1984); Wilkinson v. Hicks,
179 Cal. Rptr. 5 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981); Keith v. Russell T. Bundy & Assoc., Inc., 495 So. 2d
1223 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986); Peterson v. Idaho First Nat'l Bank, 791 P.2d 1303 (Idaho
1990); Peterson v. Lou Bachrodt Chevrolet Co., 329 N.E.2d 785 (Ill. 1975); Grimes v. Axtell Ford Lincoln-Mercury, 403 N.W.2d 781 (Iowa 1987); Brigham v. Hudson Motors, Inc.,
392 A.2d 130 (N.H. 1978); Jaramillo v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 906 N.E.2d 387 (N.Y. 2009);
Tillman v. Vance Equip. Co., 596 P.2d 1299 (Or. 1979); Harrison v. Bill Cairns Pontiac of
Marlow Heights, Inc., 549 A.2d 385 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1988); Gorath v. Rockwell Int'l,
Inc., 441 N.W.2d 128 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989); Allenberg v. Bentley Hedges Travel Serv.,
Inc., 22 P.3d 223 (Okla. 2001) (adopting majority rule); Crandell v. Larkin & Jones Appliance Co., 334 N.W.2d 31 (S.D. 1981); see also DeVoe Chevrolet-Cadillac, Inc. v. Cartwright, 526 N.E.2d 1237 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988); Freeman v. Delaware Auto Sales, Inc., 1987
WL 25492 (Del. Super. Ct. 1987) (precluding recovery on warranty grounds); cf Frey, 734
A.2d at 19 (Beck, J., dissenting); Nelson, 467 N.W.2d at 528-30 (Steinmetz, J., concurring)
(urging limits on strict liability for used-product sellers despite majorities holding that strict
liability applies to used-product sellers). For further discussion of the majority rule, see infra
notes 109-45 and accompanying text.
7.
See, e.g., Pelnar v. Rosen Sys., Inc., 964 F. Supp. 1277 (E.D. Wis. 1997); Tillman, 596 P.2d at 1304; Peterson, 791 P.2d at 1306; see also LaRosa v. Superior Court, 176
Cal. Rptr. 224, 229 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981); Tauber-Arons Auctioneers Co. v. Superior Court,
161 Cal. Rptr. 789 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980).
See, e.g., Peterson,791 P.2d at 1305; Tillman, 596 P.2d at 1303-04.
8.
See Jaramillo v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 536 F.3d 140 (2d Cir. 2008) (certifying
9.
question of whether strict liability applies to used-good sellers to New York Court of Appeals). Compare Ikerd v. Lapworth, 435 F.2d 197, 202-03 (7th Cir. 1970) (applying Indiana
law, concluding no strict liability where truck sold "as-is," but not relying on any Indiana
case law for that conclusion), and Sell v. Bertsch & Co., 577 F. Supp. 1393, 1399 (D. Kan.
1984) (finding that "the Kansas Supreme Court would declare that the seller of a used product who has not repaired or remanufactured the product is not subject to strict liability if that
product is defective"), with Buckbee v. United Gas Pipeline Co., 542 So. 2d 81 (La. Ct. App.
1989), rev'd on other grounds, 561 So. 2d 76 (La. 1990) (reversing the appellate court's
opinion intimating that a seller who reconditions or resells a used product is strictly liable),
and Stillie v. AM Int'l, Inc., 850 F. Supp. 960 (D. Kan. 1994) (reaching opposite predictions
in the same district court as Sell on whether Kansas would impose strict liability on usedgood sellers).
No reported decisions exist for the following states: Alabama, Colorado, Ha10.
waii, Kentucky, Maine, Michigan, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North Caro-
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Despite extensive scholarship about policies for and against strict liability for used-product sellers in the abstract, scholars have not examined
- the real-world effects of a used-product market. As a result, courts risk
overlooking the substantial benefits of the used-product market. To fill this
analytical gap, this article examines the economic and social benefits of a
used-product market unencumbered by strict liability. Because of these
benefits, this article urges courts to adopt the majority rule and, accordingly, reject further expansion of strict liability to used-product sellers.
Part II briefly summarizes the history of strict products liability law
and explains the public policies that led to its creation. Part III sets forth the
current split over whether strict liability should apply to used-product sellers. Part IV then concludes that the majority rule best serves the underlying
policies of strict liability.
Used-product sellers serve an essential role in fostering an efficient
economy. They help low-income consumers buy affordable, quality goods.
They help businesses and governments recycle, which reduces the cost and
environmental impact of the manufacture of new products. By broadening
the reasonable care standard for used-product sellers, courts will recognize
these legitimate social benefits of a used-product market. Although injured
consumers do have an interest in compensation, a broader reasonable care
standard would also produce the fairest outcome. In addition, the minority
rule improperly assumes that used-product sellers will be able to insure
against the risk of selling a defective product, even though such an insurance system would be difficult to establish and maintain. Expanded strict
liability instead risks forcing used-product sellers to act as virtual insurers
for any kind of latent defect. Moreover, the majority rule recognizes that
legislatures are better suited to weigh the competing policies of strict liability than courts. In short, the benefits of a used-product market-and the
harms of imposing strict liability on used-product sellers-suggest that the
majority rule better accomplishes the underlying policy of strict liability.
II.

BACKGROUND

Nowadays, "products liability" refers broadly to the decisional and
statutory law that lets injured persons recover money damages from manufacturers and sellers of defective products." This term encompasses four
principal claims. Three of these claims-negligence, breach of warranty,
12
and misrepresentation-developed centuries ago at English common law.
lina, North Dakota, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Virginia,
West Virginia, and Wyoming. See Bateman, supra note 3.
11.
1 OwEN,supranote4,§ 1:5.
12.
Id. §§ 1:3-1:4.
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Strict liability in tort, however, arose only about forty years ago in American courts. 13 While the traditional products liability claims still exist, strict
liability developed in response to product safety concerns under modern
manufacturing and distribution processes and
to alleviate the constraints
14
plaintiffs.
on
put
claims
traditional
these
that
A.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW

1.

Common Law Foundationsin Negligence and Warranty Law

In England, common law products liability replaced the ancient Roman rule of caveat emptor-buyer beware.' 5 Beginning in the nineteenth
century, the common law developed two products liability claims: warranty
and negligence. 16Warranty is a contract-based claim founded on an express
or implied agreement between seller and buyer.' 7 Under warranty, a seller
can recover if the product is not fit for the ordinary purpose for which
goods of that type are sold.' 8 By contrast, negligence is a tort-based claim
that focuses on the seller's conduct.' 9 A seller is liable for negligence if his
conduct falls below the standard of care that a reasonable seller would have
used in the same or similar circumstances, and his conduct causes an injury
to a party.2 °
Negligence and warranty are foundational products liability claims
even today, but their pleading requirements inherently prevent plaintiffs
from bringing some claims. 21 A seller may have several contract-based
ways to limit his or her warranty liability. 22 A seller may effectively disclaim warranties under certain conditions. 23 And depending on the jurisdiction, a buyer must give timely notice as a prerequisite for recovery. 24 Similarly, in negligence, a plaintiff must identify the particular "point ... [at
13.
Id.
14.
Id.at § 1:5.
15.
Id.§§ 1:2-1:3.
16.
1 OwEN, supra note 4, § 1:3.
17.
Id.§ 1:5.
18.
U.C.C. § 2-314 (1977) (recognizing implied warranty of merchantability);
U.C.C. § 2-315 (1977) (recognizing implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose).
19.
1 OwEN,supra note 4,§ 1:5.
20. Id.
21.
See Humes, supra note 2, at 376-381.
22.
U.C.C. § 2-719 (1977) (letting a seller limit remedies available under a warranty
under certain circumstances).
23.
U.C.C. § 2-316 (1977) (providing that implied warranties may be excluded by
expressions like "as is," "with all faults," or other language which in ordinary understanding
calls the buyer's attention to the exclusion of warranties and makes plain that there is no
implied warranty).
24.
See 1 OWEN, supra note 4, § 1:5.
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25
which] the seller's conduct fell below the requisite standard of due care."
But plaintiffs are generally unfamiliar with increasingly complex manufacturing processes.26 As a result, plaintiffs may not know whether a particular
process adequately resembles the processes used by similarly situated
manufacturers to represent due care.27 If a plaintiff fails to comply with
these pleading requirements, he may not be able to bring an otherwise valid
products liability claim.
Historically, however, privity of contract was the primary barrier that
blocked most products liability claims. 28 Under privity of contract, a plaintiff may proceed on an alleged violation of duty only if the plaintiff first
proves that a contractual relationship existed between plaintiff and defendant.29 While born in England, privity of contract for products liability
claims quickly spread to American courts.30 Privity set a clear limit on
product-related duties, which limited the liability of a manufacturer or
wholesaler for selling a defective good. 31 At the time, privity also advanced
the social policy goal of encouraging the growth of America's nascent industries.32 As explained by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court:

If a contractor who erects a house, who builds a bridge, or
performs any other work, the manufacturer who constructs
a boiler, piece of machinery, or a steam-ship, owes a duty
to the whole world, that his work or his machine or his
steam-ship, shall contain no hidden defect, it is difficult to
measure the extent of his responsibility, and no prudent
man would engage in such occupations upon such conditions. It is safer and wiser to confine such liabilities to the
parties immediately concerned.33
On similar grounds, nineteenth century American courts generally permitted products liability claims only if based in negligence or warranty.34
The privity barrier started to crumble in the early twentieth century. In
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.,35 the New York Court of Appeals became
25.
26.
27.
28.
L. REv. 75,
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id.
See Humes, supra note 2, at 376-77.
See id.
Oscar S. Gray, Reflections on the HistoricalContext of Section 402A, 10 TOURO
81-82 (1993).
Winterbottom v. Wright, (1842) 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex.).
1OwEN, supra note 4, § 1:4.
Id.
Id.
Curtain v. Somerset, 21 A. 244, 245 (Pa. 1891).
1 OWEN, supra note 4, § 1:4.
111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916).
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the first American court to reject a privity defense for a negligence products
liability claim. 36 Later courts followed MacPherson and consequently rejected privity. 37 But courts then imposed contract-based implied warranties
of quality on manufacturers, which were still subject to privity.38 At the
same time, manufacturers began selling their products through wholesalers
and retailers. 39 As a result, the typical consumer never established a contractual relationship with the manufacturer. 40 For this reason, despite
MacPherson, privity continued to prevent many plaintiffs from bringing
products liability claims against manufacturers and related sellers.4 '
2.

The Development of Strict Liability in Tortfor ProductDefects on
Public Policy Grounds

As a result of MacPhersonand influential scholarship, courts began to
recognize strict products liability. 42 California Supreme Court Justice Roger
J. Traynor led the way in his concurrence in Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling
Co. 43 Although the court held that the defendant could pursue a negligence
claim under a res ipsa loquitor theory, 44 Justice Traynor urged that "[e]ven
if there is no negligence ... public policy demands that responsibility be
fixed wherever it will most effectively reduce the hazards to life and health
inherent in defective products that reach the market. ' 4' 5
Supported by scholarship, 46 the California Supreme Court ultimately
47
adopted strict liability in tort in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.
In presuming a new duty for commercial distribution of goods, the court
abandoned the old contract-based limits on products liability claims like
privity, warranty, notice, and disclaimer.48 In reaching this holding, the
court emphasized that strict liability would shift the cost of product-related

36.
Id at 1051.
37.
William L. Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1100-02 (1960) (explaining courts' adoption and extension of
the MacPherson rule).
1 OWEN, supra note 4, § 1:4.
38.
39.
Id
40.
Id
41.

Id.

42.
Id.
150 P.2d 436, 440-44 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., concurring).
43.
44.
Id. at 440.
45.
Id
46.
See, e.g., Prosser, supra note 37, at 1140-42 (arguing for establishment of strict
liability in tort on all sellers in chain of distribution).
47.
377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963).
48.
Id
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injuries from consumers to manufacturers and the implicit 4representation
by
9
use.
intended
its
for
safe
is
product
a
that
the manufacturer
After Greenman, courts rushed to adopt strict liability in tort. 50 In
1965, the American Law Institute accelerated the movement by publishing
the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Its section 402A imposes strict liability
on "one who sells" a defective product that was unreasonably dangerous to
the consumer, so long as: (1) the "seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product" and (2) the product "is expected to and does reach the
user or consumer without substantial change in the condition in which it is
sold.",5 1 In urging courts to adopt strict liability well beyond traditional limits, section 402A's commentary urged that strict liability should apply to
"any product sold in the condition, or substantially the same condition, in
which it is expected to reach the ultimate user or consumer. 5 2 In announcing this substantial change from common law, the drafters reasoned that it
would serve several important public policies, including the "special responsibility" owed by a seller who markets its product for use and consumption, the consumer's expectation and often forced reliance that a seller
will stand behind its goods, and the enterprise liability justification that
sellers, not injured consumers, should bear the cost of injurious products as
a cost of doing business.53 Greenman and section 402A were so influential
all jurisdictions have adopted section 402A or a similar provithat nearly
4
5

sion.
B.

THE PUBLIC POLICIES ADVANCED BY STRICT LIABILITY

By imposing liability without fault, strict products liability breaks with
the traditional, common law bases for products liability claims: the law of
negligence and of warranty.55
Courts emphasize that the demands of public policy justify this onerous exception to the traditional rule of liability based on fault.56 In adopting
and extending strict liability, courts have principally relied on four poli49.

Id. at 901.

50.
See William L. Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REV. 791, 793-94 (1966) (calling the widespread adoption of strict
products liability "the most rapid and altogether spectacular overturn of an established rule
in the entire history of the law of torts").
51.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(l)(b) (1965).
Id. cmt. d.
52.
Id. cmt. c.
53.
1 OWEN, supra note 4, § 1:5.
54.
55.
Id.
56.
See, e.g., Suklijan v. Charles Ross & Son Co., 503 N.E.2d 1358, 1360 (N.Y.
1986) ("Imposition of this onerous [strict] liability rests largely on considerations of public
policy.").
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cies--enterprise liability/efficiency, risk-deterrence, implied representation/consumer expectation, and fairness.57

1.

EnterpriseLiability andEfficient Resource Allocation

The theory of ehterprise liability derives from the Worker's Compensation Acts, which let workers injured on the job recover from their employers without proving fault.5 8 As applied to common law tort, enterprise
liability seeks to force manufacturers and sellers to absorb the costs of accidents resulting from the sale of defective products. 59 At the time of purchase, a consumer does not also pay for the cost of an accident; thus, enterprise liability asserts that a product is over-consumed if its price does not
reflect its accident costs. 60 By holding businesses strictly liable for injuries
caused by defective products, enterprise liability seeks to increase a product's price according to its true cost to society.6' Consumers will not buy
dangerous goods because they cost more, so manufacturers will make fewer
dangerous goods.62 In theory, enterprise liability will efficiently allocate
resources according to their true social cost, resulting in an equitable
spreading of risk between consumers and sellers.63
Enterprise liability presupposes certain market characteristics in order
to equitably spread risks. To properly price all goods according to their true
64
social cost, strict liability must apply to all sellers of defective goods.
Otherwise, one defective product seller would cost relatively less, thereby
encouraging consumers to buy the cheaper, more dangerous product. 65 In
addition, the maintenance of a strict liability system substantially increases
the number of insurers, courts, agencies, and other actors in the marketplace. Each of these actors imposes its own, additional costs to operate-its
"transaction costs"-which must be passed on to the consumer in addition
to the higher prices for incorporated accident costs. 66 If transaction costs
57.
See Goodwin, supra note 2, at 53645 (discussing these five policies for strict
liability); Humes, supra note 2, at 384-96.
58.
See generally Gregory C. Keating, The Theory of Enterprise Liability and
Common Law Strict Liability, 54 VAND. L. REv. 1285 (2001) (explaining the origins of enterprise liability and key scholarship expanding its theories into the tort system).
59.
Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70
YALE L.J. 499, 500 (1961).
60.
Id. at 501.
61.
Id. at 510.
62.
Id.
63.
Id. at 530.
64.
Calabresi, supra note 59, at 501-04; Humes, supra note 2, at 389.
65.
Calabresi, supra note 59, at 501-04; Humes, supra note 2, at 389.
66.
Calabresi, supra note 59, at 533-34. In addition, the opportunity cost analysis
pioneered by Ronald Coase is a helpful way to analyze these problems. See Ronald Coase,
The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 43 (1960). Coase recognized that
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become too high, then they may cost more than any benefits resulting from
enterprise liability.67 At some point, the costs of maintaining a system of
strict liability
outweigh the risk spreading and fairness benefits of enterprise
68
liability.
Enterprise liability was a key justification for the creation of strict
products liability. 69 As a matter of "public policy," the Restatement (Second) of Torts stated that "the burden of accidental injuries caused by prod70
ucts intended for consumption be placed upon those who market them.,
Accident costs would "be treated as a cost of production against which liability insurance can be obtained.",71 Enterprise liability pricing would
spread out the burden of accidental injuries so that injured consumers
would not bear the full burden.7 2
2.

Risk Deterrence

By incorporating the cost of accidents into the cost of production,
strict liability may also deter the manufacture of defective products.73 Under
this rationale, the goal of strict liability is to keep manufacturers from making dangerous goods. 74 Like enterprise liability, risk-deterrence uses the
pricing mechanism to achieve its goal. 75 By incorporating the cost of accidents into the cost of manufacture, strict liability seeks to reduce consumer
demand for dangerous goods.76 In turn, reduced demand will shrink profits
from the sale of dangerous goods, thereby creating an economic incentive
for manufacturers to avoid liability by making safer products.77 Although
not directly mentioned in the Second Restatement, courts rely on risk-

[e]conomists who study problems of the firm habitually use an opportunity cost approach and compare the receipts obtained from a given combination of factors with alternative business arrangements. It would seem
desirable to use a similar approach when dealing with questions of economic policy and to compare the total product yielded by alternative social arrangements.

Id.

67.
Calabresi, supra note 59, at 533-34.
68.
See Calabresi, supra note 59, at 533-34; Coase, supra note 66, at 43.
69.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. c (1965); Goodwin, supra note
2, at 536-45; Humes, supra note 2, at 384-96.

70.

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 402A cmt. c (1965).

Id.
See Goodwin, supra note 2, at 543; Humes, supra note 2, at 390-39.
See Goodwin, supra note 2, at 541-43; Humes, supra note 2, at 393-95.
See Humes, supra note 2, at 393-95.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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deterrence to justify the expansion of strict products liability.78 Because of
the complexity of modem manufacturing methods, some courts have concluded that the manufacturer is one of the few parties who has the practical
opportunity-and a considerable incentive-to know 79whether an article is
safely designed and manufactured for its intended use.
3.

Implied Representation/ConsumerExpectation

Strict liability further seeks to make manufacturers stand behind the
goods they sell in the marketplace.80 This justification arose from strict liability's roots in the implied warranty of quality.8 ' In the new goods context, when a manufacturer puts a product into the marketplace, the manufacturer impliedly represents that a product is fit for its intended use. 2 As a
corollary, a consumer reasonably expects the goods that he buys to be safe
for their intended use.8 3 Strict liability-unencumbered by technical or evidentiary restraints-arose in part as a way to enforce these expectations in
mass manufactured new goods.8 4 Similarly, the Second Restatement drafters justified their rule based on the "ancient... [and] special responsibility
for the safety of the public undertaken by one who enters into the business
of supplying human beings with products which may endanger the safety of
their persons and property. 8 5 The drafters also emphasized the consumer's
"forced reliance" on a retailer or wholesaler by buying goods in such a
market.86
4.

Fairnessand Compensation

Despite imposing liability without fault, courts justify strict liability as
a matter of fairness.87 In essence, this policy is an alternative argument for
enterprise liability. Even if it does not lead to an efficient allocation of accident costs, strict liability redistributes the burdens of accident costs from
78.
See, e.g., Tillman v. Vance Equip. Co., 596 P.2d 1299, 1303 (Or. 1979). For a
discussion of the holding in Tillman, see infra notes 118-132 and accompanying text.
79.
Sprung v. MTR Ravensburg, Inc., 788 N.E.2d 620, 622-23 (N.Y. 2003) (citing
Codling v. Paglia, 298 N.E.2d 622, 627 (N.Y. 1973)).
80.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. f (1965); see also Goodwin,
supra note 2, at 545-48; Humes, supra note 2, at 395-96.
81.
See Humes, supra note 2, at 394.
82.
U.C.C. § 2-314 (1977).
83.
See Humes, supra note 2, at 395.
84.
Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 901 (Cal. 1963) (en banc).
85.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. f(1965).
86.
Id.
87.
See Calabresi, supra note 59, at 501; Goodwin, supra note 2, at 545-48; Humes,
supra note 2, at 395-96.
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victims to manufacturers, who are supposed to be better able to bear those
costs. 8 8 Absent strict liability, manufacturers would unfairly profit from
selling defective products. 89 In addition, injured consumers are often unprepared to meet the overwhelming costs of lost time and health care that result from product-related injuries. 90 Thus, strict liability lets an injured consumer pursue her claim without having to face the evidentiary and technical
pleading barriers to recovery under negligence or warranty law.9 1 The Second Restatement drafters were concerned with fairness, believing that the
injured consumer "is entitled to the maximum of protection at the hands of
someone, and the proper persons to afford it are those who market the
products. 9
Nevertheless, fair compensation for accident victims is generally regarded as inadequate on its own to justify extending strict liability. 93 In the
past, the fair compensation justification for enterprise liability has sought a
"deep pocket" for the plaintiff.94 This "deep pocket" justification hearkens
back to the theory of the diminishing value of money, which asserts that a
rich man suffers less from the loss of one dollar than a poor man suffers
from the loss of one dollar.95 Of course, this assumes that only the poor
have product accidents. It further assumes that the injured consumer lacks
disability insurance, access to Worker's Compensation, nor any other reliable means to bear the cost of an accident. Given these questionable assumptions, it is difficult to conceive of a circumstance where a consumer
would be better able to bear the burden of injury than a "deep pocket"
product seller. 96 Under this theory, compensation would justify absolute
liability-that is, liability without causation-for any injury associated with
any product. 97 To maintain causation and fault as the foundations for products liability, compensation alone is therefore not regarded as an adequate
justification for strict products liability.98

88.
See Calabresi, supra note 59, at 501.
89.
Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 441 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J.,
concurring).
90. Id.
91.
See 1 OwEN, supra note 4, § 1:2.
92.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. c (1965).
93.
See Humes, supra note 2, at 396.
94.
See Calabresi, supra note 59, at 527-28.
95. See id.;
Humes, supra note 2, at 393.
96.
See Antone v. Greater Ariz. Auto. Auction, Inc., 155 P.3d 1074, 1078 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 2007).
97.
See Humes, supra note 2, at 396.
98.
Id.

THE BENEFITS OF LIMITING STRICT LIABILITY FOR USED-PRODUCT SELLERS

2010]

II.

361

STRICT LIABILITY FOR USED GOODS SELLERS: THE CURRENT
SPLIT

The current debate over strict liability for used-product sellers arose
from differing interpretations of section 402A in the Restatement (Second)
of Torts. While some courts simply applied section 402A to both new and
used products, other courts and scholars began to question whether imposing strict liability on used-product sellers would advance the underlying
policies of strict liability. 99 This Part reviews section 402A's guidance on
the issue and the rationale for each side of the split, highlighting the leading
cases along the way.
A.

THE UNCERTAIN PLACE FOR USED-PRODUCT SELLERS UNDER
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS SECTION 402A

Section 402A did not directly address used-product sellers. Section
402A's commentary, however, indirectly gave some guidance on the issue.
In comment f, the drafters provided a series of examples to help define what
enterprises are "in the business of selling products for use or consumption." 100 Comment f opines that section 402A would apply to a movie theatre that sells popcorn or ice cream for consumption in the theatre or at
home. 01 By contrast, strict liability would not apply to a homemaker who
occasionally sells a jar of jam or a pound of sugar. 102 Nor would strict liability apply to a car owner who, on one occasion, sells his used car to a
used-car dealer, even though he knows the dealer will resell it.103 Finally,
the commentary noted that section 402A would not apply to the sale of
merchants' stock outside the usual course of business, like execution sales
or bankruptcy sales.' 4 Together, these examples suggest that only an enterprise that sells goods "regularly"--as opposed to "occasionally"-is subject
to strict liability.' 05
Section 402A provided only one illustration, which involved a manufacturer that sold a defective can of beans that injured a consumer. 10 6 This
illustration emphasized that the injured consumer could sue the entire chain
Compare Turner v. Int'l Harvester Co., 336 A.2d 62 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1975), and
99.
Hovenden v. Tenbush, 529 S.W.2d 302 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975) (adopting minority rule), with
Peterson v. Lou Bachrodt Chevrolet Co., 329 N.E.2d 785 (Il1. 1975), and Tiliman v. Vance
Equip. Co., 596 P.2d 1299 (Or. 1979) (adopting majority rule).
100.
101.

102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. f (1965).
Id.

Id.
Id.
Id.
See Galindo v. Precision Am. Corp., 754 F.2d 1212, 1219 (5th Cir. 1985).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. c, illus. 1 (1965).
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of distribution-including the manufacturer, the wholesalers, and the retailer-for selling the defective can of beans that caused his injuries, without any proof of negligence.' 0 7 But because it dealt with the sellers of a
new, perishable product, this illustration provided little guidance for courts
on how to apply section 402A to a used-product seller. 0 8
B.

THE MAJORITY RULE: A USED-PRODUCT SELLER IS NOT STRICTLY
LIABLE FOR THE MERE SALE OF A PRODUCT

The majority of courts have held that a used-product seller is not subject to strict liability if it did not create the alleged defect and if it sold the
product in the same condition as when the seller acquired it for resale.' 0 9
The leading case to adopt this rule is Peterson v. Lou Bachrodt Chevrolet
Co." 0 In Peterson, a used car struck two children as they walked home
from school, killing one and maiming the other."' On his children's behalf,
the father sued the driver of the car and the used-car dealer in strict liability,
alleging that the car's defect caused the driver to lose control and injure the
children. "2
The Illinois Supreme Court refused to impose strict liability on the
used-car dealer. 3 The court reasoned that strict products liability should
apply only to the party that created the risk."14 The court emphasized that
the plaintiff had not alleged that the used car was defective when it left the
manufacturer's control, or that it was defective when it left the dealer's
control. 1 5 If strict liability was applied here, the court believed that it
would essentially make a used-car dealer "an insurer against defects which
had come into existence after the chain of distribution was completed, and
' 16
while the product was under the control of one or more consumers." "
Without any prior precedent or statutes that imposed such a heavy responsibility on the manufacturer, the court refused to extend strict liability to
used-product sellers." 7

107.
See id.
108.
See Humes, supra note 2, at 397.
109.
2 OWEN, supranote 4, § 20:5; see also cases cited supra note 6.
110.
329 N.E.2d 785 (I11.
1975).
111.
Id.at 786.
112.
Id.
113.
Id.at 787.
114.
Id.
at 786-87.
115.
Peterson,329 N.E.2d at 787.
116.
Id.
117.
Id.
Justice Goldenhirsch dissented, urging the court to adopt strict liability. Id.at
787 (Goldenhirsch, J., dissenting). For more discussion of this dissent, see infra note 147
and accompanying text.
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In a case that would become very influential, the Oregon Supreme
Court announced in Tillman v. Vance Equipment Co. 118 why strict liability
should not apply to used-product sellers as a matter of public policy.'19 In
Tillman, the plaintiff was injured while trying to grease a crane's gears
while it was in operation.120 Plaintiff s employer purchased the twenty-fouryear-old crane "as-is" from the defendant, a used-equipment dealer. 121 The
Oregon Supreme Court held that strict liability should not apply to the usedequipment dealer as a matter of public policy. 122 The court first recognized
three justifications for extending strict liability: (1) compensation or risk123
spreading, (2) consumer expectation, and (3) overall risk reduction.
While acknowledging that used-product sellers could compensate injured
consumers, the court emphasized that compensation alone cannot justify
strict liability. 124 In refusing to extend strict liability to used-product sellers,
the court concluded that125neither consumer expectations nor risk reduction
supported its extension.
First, regarding consumer expectation, the court reasoned that usedproduct markets "generally speaking, operate on the apparent understanding
that the seller, even though he is in the business of selling such goods,
makes no particular representation about their quality simply by offering
them for sale.' 26 In other words, "[i]f a buyer wants some assurance of
quality, he typically either bargains for it in the specific transaction or seeks
out a dealer who routinely offers it.' ' 127 Thus, the court found that "the sale
of a used product, without more, may not be found to generate the kind of
created by the
expectations of safety that the courts have held are justifiably
' 128
introduction of a new product into the stream of commerce."
Second, regarding risk reduction, the court emphasized that-unlike
new-product sellers-the used-product seller "generally has no direct relationship with either manufacturers or distributors.' ' 129 As a result, usually
"there is no ready channel of communication by which the dealer and the
118.
596 P.2d 1299 (Or. 1979).
119.
Id.at 1300.
120.
Id.
121.
Id.
Id.at 1301. In so holding, the court did not reach the issue of whether the "as is"
122.
disclaimer was sufficient to disclaim liability for a design defect. Id
Tillman, 596 P.2d at 1303. The court noted that enterprise liability alone was not
123.
a justification for strict liability for defective products. Id.The court also did not address a
lessor's strict liability for the leasing of a defective used product. Id. at 1305.
124.
Id.at 1303.
Id.
125.
Id.
126.
127.
Id.
Tillman, 596 P.2d at 1304.
128.
129.
Id.
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manufacturer can exchange information about possible dangerous defects in
30
particular product lines or about actual and potential liability claims."'
The court further distinguished used-product dealers because they often
cannot seek indemnification from the manufacturer due to statutes of limitation and the increasing difficulty of finding an existing and solvent manufacturer to sue as time passes.13 ' Thus, used-product sellers cannot put fi32
nancial pressure on the manufacturer to build safer goods. 1
Tillman's policy analysis persuaded the majority of courts to reject
strict liability. The state supreme courts of Alaska, Idaho, Iowa, South Dakota, and Oklahoma explicitly followed Tillman in holding that strict liability should not apply to used-product sellers. 133 The California Courts of
Appeal also issued several decisions similarly relying on Tillman's policy
rationale to reach their conclusion. 134 Several other courts have also rejected
strict liability for used-product sellers, relying on Tillman's logic even
without explicitly citing it.' 35 In addition, the Seventh and Eighth Circuits
have relied on Tillman to reach a similar prediction for the states of Connecticut and Missouri. 36
The Restatement (Third) of Torts recently adopted the majority rule.
Section 8 specifically provides that a used-product seller is liable only under four circumstances. 37 First, a used-product seller is always liable for
130.
Id.
131.
Id.
132.
Id.
133.
Kodiak Elec. Ass'n v. DeLaval Turbine, Inc., 694 P.2d 150 (Alaska 1984);
Peterson v. Idaho First Nat'l Bank, 791 P.2d 1303 (Idaho 1990); Grimes v. Axtell Ford
Lincoln-Mercury, 403 N.W.2d 781 (Iowa 1987); Allenberg v. Bentley Hedges Travel Serv.,
Inc., 22 P.3d 223 (Okla. 2001); Crandell v. Larkin & Jones Appliance Co., 334 N.W.2d 31
(S.D. 1981).
134.
LaRosa v. Super. Ct., 176 Cal. Rptr. 224, 229 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981); Wilkinson
v. Hicks, 179 Cal. Rptr. 5 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981); Tauber-Irons Auctioneers v. Super. Ct., 161
Cal. Rptr. 789 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980).
135.
Keith v. Russell T. Bundy & Assoc., Inc., 495 So. 2d 1223, 1228 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1986); Buckbee v. United Gas Pipeline Co., 542 So. 2d 81, 85 (La. Ct. App. 1989),
rev'don other grounds, 561 So. 2d 76 (La. 1990); Harrison v. Bill Cairns Pontiac of Marlow
Heights, Inc., 549 A.2d 385 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1988); Gorath v. Rockwell Int'l, Inc., 441
N.W.2d 128 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989).
136.
King v. Damiron Corp., 113 F.3d 93, 96 (7th Cir. 1997) (applying Connecticut
law); Haber v. Altec Indus., Inc., 812 F. Supp. 954, 958-60, 963-64 (W.D. Mo. 1993), affd,
5 F.3d 339 (8th Cir. 1993) (applying Missouri law). The Seventh Circuit's decision in King
is of uncertain precedential value because the Connecticut Superior Court reached the opposite result in Stanton v. Carlson Sales Inc., 728 A.2d 534 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1998). The
Eighth Circuit's decision in Haber is also of uncertain value because it is merely a "prediction" of how the Missouri Supreme Court would decide the issue. Haber v. Altec Indus.,
Inc., 5 F.3d 339, 339 (8th Cir. 1993). The Missouri Supreme Court has not yet reached this
issue. See Bateman, supra note 3, at 1.
137.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 8 (1998).
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negligent conduct. 138 Second, a used-product seller is subject to strict liability only if the product has a manufacturing defect and the "seller's marketing of the product would cause a reasonable person in the position of the
buyer to expect the used product to present no greater risk of defect than if
the product were new," or-third-the seller or a predecessor in the chain
of distribution remanufactured the used product.139 Fourth, a used-product
seller is strictly liable if the used product's defect arises from noncompliance with an applicable product safety statute or regulation. 140 Even though
it is not yet widely recognized,' 4 1 the Third Restatement follows the major142
ity rule while accommodating its variations across many jurisdictions.
In its rationale for adopting the majority rule, the Third Restatement
drafters found that "[a] used-product seller is properly subjected to liability,
on both fairness and efficiency grounds, when its negligence causes
harm."' 143 First, "exposing commercial used-product sellers to liability for
harm caused by their negligence creates incentives for them to take reasonable steps to reduce risks of harm."' 44 In addition, finding that used-product
consumers are generally aware of the risks of deteriorating products, the
drafters reasoned that "primary responsibility for allocating these risks may,
in the absence of fault on the part of the used-product seller or some special
circumstance that justifies strict liability, be delegated to commercial markets for used products.' 4 5
C.

THE MINORITY RULE: A USED-PRODUCT SELLER IS STRICTLY LIABLE
FOR SELLING A DEFECTIVE GOOD

The minority of courts hold that a used-product seller is no different
than a new-product seller, and, therefore, hold used-product sellers strictly
138.
Id.§ 8(a).
139.
Id.§ 8(b)-(c).
Id. § 8(d).
140.
141.
Justice Phyllis Beck of the Pennsylvania Superior Court explicitly urged the
court to adopt the section 8 rule for used-product sellers. Frey v. Harley Davidson Motor
Co., 734 A.2d 1, 19 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999) (Beck, J., dissenting). At the same time, the Connecticut Superior Court explicitly rejected the section 8 rule. Stanton, 728 A.2d at 549. To
date, no jurisdiction has explicitly adopted section 8. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD)OF TORTS:
PROD. LIAB. § 8, case supp. (2008). The Oklahoma Supreme Court, however, noted the influence of the Third Restatement and essentially adopted its rule in holding that a usedproduct seller is not subject to strict liability if it did not create the alleged defect and if it
sold the product in the same condition as when the seller acquired it for resale. Allenberg v.
Bentley Hedges Travel Serv., Inc., 22 P.3d 223, 231 (Okla. 2001); see also id.at 229 n.17
(noting the Third Restatement rule).
142.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 8 cmt. a (1998).
Id.cmt. b.
143.
Id.
144.
145.
Id.
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liable for the sale of a defective good. 146 Foreshadowing today's deep split,
an Illinois Supreme Court Justice dissented in Peterson, finding no reason
not to impose strict liability on both used- and new-car dealers. 47 In another early case, the Texas Appellate Court first imposed strict liability on a
used-car48 seller, although the claim in that case did not involve personal
injury.
In Turner v. InternationalHarvester Co., 14 9 the Appellate Division of
the New Jersey Superior Court issued the first influential opinion imposing
strict liability on used-product sellers. 150 In Turner, the plaintiffs husband
bought a used tractor "as-is" from the defendant.1 51 While the plaintiffs
husband was working below the raised tractor, the cab collapsed, killing
him.'5 2 Among many claims, plaintiff sued defendant in strict liability, alleging the tractor was defectively manufactured
because it needed to be
53
repaired.1
be
to
engine
the
for
up
raised
Despite the "as is" disclaimer, the court held that strict liability should
apply to the seller of a serviceable car for defects which were present while
the vehicle was under the seller's control.154 Emphasizing risk spreading as
a key goal of strict liability, 55 the court reasoned that strict liability for
used-product sellers would spread the risk of defective products in the same
way that strict liability does for new-product sellers.1 56 The court acknowledged that the policies of strict liability might not equally apply to both new
146.
2 OWEN, supranote 4, § 20:5.
147.
Peterson v. Lou Bachrodt Chevrolet Co., 329 N.E.2d 785, 787 (Ill. 1975) (Goldenhersh, J., dissenting). In his dissent, Justice Goldenhersh urged that the goals of risk deterrence and compensation for victims of defective products "require application of strict liability principles to the business of selling used automobiles." Id.
148.
Hovenden v. Tenbush, 529 S.W.2d 302 (Tex. App. 1975). In Hovenden, the
Texas appellate court held a brickseller strictly liable for damage caused from selling reused
bricks. Id. at 306. The case did not involve, however, a used-durable good that was anything
like the used car, clothes dryers, or heavy machinery that most used-product dealers sell. Id.
Moreover, the case did not address the differences in strict liability policies between newproduct sellers and used-product sellers. Id. Thus, despite being the first case to reach the
issue, its precedential value is very low. See Galindo v. Precision Am. Corp., 754 F.2d 1212,
1217 (5th Cir. 1985) (finding no Texas precedent discussing the issue of strict liability for
used-product sellers in detail); New Texas Auto Auction Serv., L.P. v. Gomez De Hemandez, 249 S.W.3d 400 (Tex. 2008) (holding that auctioneer could not be held strictly liable for
defect in used car that allegedly caused fatal rollover accident, even though auctioneer held
title to the vehicle when it was sold at auction).
149.
336 A.2d 62 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1975).
150.
Id. at 69.
151.
Id. at65.
152.
Id.
153.
Id. at 65-66.
154.
Turner, 336 A.2d at 69, 72.
155.
Id. at 69.
156.
Id.
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and used goods,' 5 7 and that consumers expect diminished quality and durability in used goods. 5 8 Nevertheless, in the court's view, "[p]ublic policy
demands that the buyer receive a used chattel safe for the purpose intended
(where no substantial change will occur prior to reaching the buyer or foreseeable consumer)." 159 Otherwise, the court believed that the buyer and the
burden of a dangerously defective
general public would bear the economic
160
highways.
public
on
operating
car
used
61
The court further rejected the effectiveness of an "as-is" disclaimer.'
The court reasoned that the bargaining positions between used-car buyers
and sellers were so disproportionate that "a decent regard for the public
safety requires the thumb of the State to be on the buyer's side of the
scale. 162 Rather, "[w]hile freedom to contract need not be impaired if a
to protection, an unequivocal
buyer wishes to contract away his right
163
shown.''
be
must
defects
safety
of
waiver
After Turner, the Arizona Court of Appeals adopted the minority rule
in Jordanv. Sunnyslope Appliance Propane& Plumbing Supplies Co.' 6 In
Jordan, the plaintiff bought a used propane tank from the defendant, a used
propane-tank seller. 65 The propane tank's hose disconnected, causing the
tank to explode and destroy plaintiffs house. 66 Plaintiff sued defendant in
strict liability.

67

The court held that strict liability applied to the used-

product dealer. 68 Following Turner, the court reasoned that strict liability
would impose enterprise liability on used-product sellers, thus efficiently
spreading risk from injured consumers to used-product sellers. 69 In addition, strict liability would deter the manufacture of dangerous products by
encouraging used-product sellers to increase maintenance and inspection of
products before they are offered for sale.' 70 Emphasizing this riskdeterrence rationale for strict liability, the court rejected the argument that a
used-product seller is outside the chain of distribution. Like a new-product
157.
Id.at 67.
158.
Id.at 69.
Turner, 336 A.2d at 69.
159.
160.
Id.
161.
Id. at 70-71.
162.
Id. at 71.
Id. at 70-71.
163.
164.
660 P.2d 1236 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983). But see Antone v. Greater Ariz. Auto
Auction, Inc., 155 P.2d 1074, 1078 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007) (limiting the scope of strict liability for auctioneers because it did not serve the policies of strict liability).
Jordan,660 P.2d at 1237.
165.
166.
Id.
167.
Id.
168.
Id, at 1241.
169.
See id,at 1241.
170.
Jordan,660 P.2d at 1240, 1242.
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seller, a used-product seller profits from his business,"' and the court found
nothing in section 402A that required the seller to be within the initial chain
of distribution. 72 In any event, the court believed that any used-product
seller likely could obtain indemnity from the manufacturer. 173 On similar
grounds, the Wisconsin Supreme Court and appellate courts in Connecticut,
Pennsylvania,
and Washington have imposed strict liability on used-product
74
sellers.
Several federal courts, in predicting that states would adopt the minority rule, have expanded on the policy reasons first advanced in Turner. In
Galindo v. Precision American Corp.,' 75 the Fifth Circuit advanced comment f of section 402A as the test for liability, albeit "not ...a test of easy
application."' 176 Accordingly, a seller is subject to liability so long as it "is
engaged in the business of selling" a defective product. 77 Based on the
examples of a wife selling homemade jam and a private person selling his
used car to a dealer, the court determined that strict liability would apply
unless:
[S]ales are so infrequent or sales efforts are so minimal that
it cannot be said that the seller has voluntarily assumed a
special responsibility for product safety, that the public has
the right to expect that the seller will stand behind the
product, or that the seller will stand behind the product, or
that the seller is best
able to spread the loss caused by the
178
product's defects.
Similarly, in Gonzalez v. Rutherford Corp.,'17 9 the Eastern District of
New York predicted that New York would impose strict liability on all
used-goods sellers.180 After examining both sides of the national split,'81 the
court concluded that imposing strict liability on used-product sellers would
171.

Id.
at 1240.

172.
Id.at 1242.
173.
Id.
174.
See, e.g., Stanton v. Carlson Sales, Inc., 728 A.2d 534 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1998);
Frey v. Harley Davidson Motor Co., 734 A.2d 1 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999); Thompson v.
Rockford Mach. Tool, Inc., 744 P.2d 357 (Wash. Ct. App. 1987); Nelson v. Nelson Hardware, Inc., 467 N.W.2d 518 (Wis. 1991).
175.
754 F.2d 1212 (5th Cir. 1985).
Id.at 1217.
176.
177.
Id.at 1216-17.
178.
Id.at 1219.
179.
881 F. Supp. 829 (E.D.N.Y. 1995).
180.
Id.at 841-42. The New York Court of Appeals, however, did not follow this
prediction. See Jaramillo v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 906 N.E.2d 387 (N.Y. 2009).
181.
Gonzalez, 881 F. Supp. at 838-41.
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sellers. 182
accomplish all of the policy goals of strict liability for new-good
Because new-product sellers were held strictly liable regardless of any actual ability to pressure the manufacturer to improve product safety, the
court found "no principled reason" to hold used-product sellers strictly li183
able only if they maintain an ongoing relationship with the manufacturer.
The court also reasoned that used goods are at least as risky as new goods,
and that used-good dealers help create the risk of defective products by
reintroducing them into the market. 184 The court found that used-product
dealers owe a special responsibility to stand behind their goods, just 18like
1
new-product sellers must, because product "fitness is presumed at law.'
In addition, the court rejected Tillman's conclusion that strict liability
would distort the used-good market. 186 Even if a plaintiff were interested in
preserving a free market for used-products, an injured consumer's interest
in compensation would trump any interest in market efficiency. 187 The court
acknowledged that strict liability could increase consumer costs,188but believed that any cost increase "may properly offset by tort savings."'
III.

COURTS SHOULD ADOPT THE MAJORITY RULE BECAUSE OF ITS
SIGNIFICANT POLICY BENEFITS

Instead of imposing strict liability on regular sellers of used goods,
courts should follow the majority rule, which generally imposes a reasonable care standard on used-product sellers. 189 The majority rule recognizes
the efficiency and deterrence functions of a thriving used-product market,
and that strict liability would smother those social benefits. 90 Although
limited strict liability might reduce the ease of recovery for plaintiffs, compensation alone does not justify the extension of strict liability.1 9' Traditional products liability claims will fairly compensate consumers for injuId. at 842-43.
182.
Id. at 842.
183.
Id. at 843.
184.
Id. at 842.
185.
See Gonzalez, 881 F. Supp. at 843. The court believed that this factor would not
186.
be given as much weight in New York as it was given in Oregon. Id.
187.
Id. at 843.
Id.
188.
See, e.g., Allenberg v. Bentley Hedges Travel Serv., Inc., 22 P.3d 223, 231
189.
(Okla. 2001); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 8 (1997).
See RESTATEMENT (THiRD) OF TORTS § 8 cmt. a (1997).
190.
See Antone v. Greater Ariz. Auto Auction, Inc., 155 P.3d 1074, 1078 (Ariz. Ct.
191.
App. 2007) (limiting strict liability for auctioneers because the compensation goal would
justify liability on seller in nearly every circumstance); Tillman v. Vance Equip. Co., 596
P.2d 1299, 1304 (Or. 1979) (finding that compensation cannot be the sole goal of strict
liability); see also Grimes v. Axtell Ford Lincoln-Mercury, 403 N.W.2d 781, 785 (Iowa
1987) (agreeing with Tillman's finding).

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30

ries caused by defective products.192 Moreover, legislatures-not courtsshould decide whether to extend strict liability because they are better
equipped 93to weigh the competing public policy interests underlying strict
liability.
A.

STRICT LIABILITY WOULD SERIOUSLY DISRUPT THE USED-PRODUCT
MARKET, WHICH LETS LOW-INCOME CONSUMERS BUY AFFORDABLE,
QUALITY GOODS

Used-product sellers "perform the socially valuable service of mitigating the inequalities of income distribution."' 94 Used-product markets perform this important social function by facilitating the resale of "durable
goods." Whereas other goods are consumed only once (e.g., a can of pop), a
durable good is consumed over time (e.g., a punch press).' 95 For instance,

while a consumer can only purchase a can of pop through a series of wholesalers and retailers, a consumer can choose between buying a new or an old
punch press from a wide variety of formal and informal sellers. 196 Most
importantly, a used-durable good is designed to last over many years, sometimes over decades.'

97

Whether a consumer will purchase a used-durable

good instead of a new-durable good depends on many factors, including
price, the rate at which the durable good loses quality
over time, and how
198
much a consumer values quality relative to price.
As a result, used-goods and new-goods are substitutes. 199 A consumer
can choose to buy a used car instead of a new car depending on how much
that consumer values price compared to diminished quality. 20 Usedproduct sellers and new-product sellers are often competitors, vying for
many of the same consumers. 20 1 As the majority rule recognizes, the used192.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 8 cmt. a (1997).
193.
See Suklijan v. Charles Ross & Son, Co., 503 N.E.2d 1358, 1360-61 (N.Y.
1986) (recognizing public policies inherent to tort law); Williams, supra note 2, at 285 (urging legislatures to resolve the issue of strict liability for used-product sellers instead of
courts).
194.
Bruce Mann & Thomas J. Holdych, When Lemons Are Better Than Lemonade:
The Case Against Mandatory Used Car Warranties, 15 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 1, 39 (1996)
(quoting Tibor Scitovsky, Towards a Theory of Second-hand Markets, 47 KYKLOS 33, 37
(1994)).
195.
Preya S. Desai et al., CoordinatingChannelsfor Durable Goods: The Impact of
Competing Secondary Markets at 8 (Rev. of Mktg. Sci., Working Paper No. 525, 2001),
availableat http://ssrn.com/abstract=310584.
196.
See id.
197.
See id.
198.
See id.
199.
See id.
200.
See Desai et al., supra note 195, at 8.
201.
See id.
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product market functions precisely because consumers do not expect used
goods and new goods to be of equivalent quality; rather, consumers trade
diminished quality for reduced price. 20 2 In turn, low-income consumers rely
on used-product markets to buy quality goods that they could not otherwise
afford.2 °3
The unique structure of the used-product market creates three noteworthy social benefits. First, it helps consumers reduce the strain of economic
downturns. During economic downturns, consumers tighten their spending
and search for additional income sources. 204 In response, used-product sellers increase their sales and inventory. 205 These everyday businessesranging from consignment stores to thrift shops-let low-income consumers buy high-quality goods even as they tighten their spending.20 6 In turn,
used-product sellers provide "recession-proof' businesses that employ
workers despite an economic downturn. 20 7
Second, used-product markets let businesses buy essential means of
production at a fraction of their new cost. 20 8 Many companies-from startups to established companies-buy rebuilt and remanufactured equipment
as a practical way to get reliable but inexpensive means of production.20 9 In
return, buyers could realize a cost savings of about sixty percent compared
to a new machine. 210 Established, high-tech companies also buy used

202.
See, e.g., Tillman v. Vance Equip. Co., 596 P.2d 1299, 1303 (Or. 1979).
203.
See Mann & Holdych, supra note 194, at 39; Ivy Choderker, Note, The First
Sale Doctrine Defense as a Limit on the Right of Publicity: Alison v. Vintage Sports
Plaques, 19 Loy. L.A. Ewr. L. REv. 413, 430 (1999) ("[T]here is a need for a secondhand
goods market. Consumers who cannot afford to pay the price of new goods rely on secondhand stores to provide them with lower priced products.").
204.
See Kate Stone Lombardi, Resale: Popularand Recession-Proof,N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 24, 2002, at 3, availableat 2002 WLNR 4085438.
205.
Press Release, The Ass'n of Resale Professionals, Resale Continues to Thrive in
a
Slow
Economy
(Oct.
22,
2009)
available
at
http://www.narts.org/i4a/pages/index.cfin?pageid=3290 (last visited Apr. 26, 2010).
206.
See Lombardi, supra note 204; Tammie Smith, Designing on a Dime, or Less:
Lean Times Make Thrift Stores, Consignment and Scavenging More Popular, RICHMOND
TIMES-DISPATCH, July 17, 2008, availableat 2008 WLNR 13329372.
Cf. Frey v. Harley Davidson Motor Co., Inc., 734 A.2d 1, 19 (Pa. Super. Ct.
207.
1999) (Beck, J., dissenting).
208.
See, e.g., Remanufactured Concrete Booms Make Sense: As Remanufacturing
Has Grown Into $100-Billion Global Industry, the Rebuilding of Truck-Mounted Concrete
Boom Pumps Has Continuedto Prosper,CONSTR. BULLETIN, Apr. 21, 2006, at 13 available
at 2006 WLNR 6919404; Upgrading Machine Tools During a Market Uptick, MODERN
MACH. SHOP, Apr. 1, 2004, at 92 availableat 2004 WLNR 11220781.
209.
See supranote 208.
210.
UpgradingMachine Tools Duringa Market Uptick, supra note 208.
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211
equipment, obtaining high quality machinery for less than half the cost.
Often these industries will rely on their in-house technical expertise to rebuild outdated equipment, thus realizing further cost savings.2 12 Even these
sophisticated companies buy and sell equipment "as is, where is. ' 2 13 Given
of valuable but
the demand for used products, several businesses dispose
24
unneeded equipment by reselling it "as is, where is." ,
Third, the used-product market encourages consumers to reuse and recycle. A thriving used-product market reduces the need to make new products, which reduces the environmental impacts of manufacturing new
goods. Consider, for example, the environmental impact of building a new
car. Roughly seventy-five percent of a car is made up of metals like aluminum, copper, brass, and zinc. 215 In the move to reduce carbon emissions,
building newer hybrid vehicles involves batteries that contain heavy metals
like nickel, lithium, and cobalt.21 6 But given the emissions required to mine,
process, and assemble a carbon-friendly vehicle,217 continued resale of used
cars could result in significant carbon savings.218
Indeed, recycling is a policy priority for the federal government and
many states. 2 19 The federal government and several states encourage companies to buy used products to make sure that there is a continuing demand

211.
Rebecca Smith, Used to Success: A Growing Cadre of Small Businesses in
Silicon Valley Building PlantsAlmost Entirely With Cast-Off Machines, SAN JOSE MERCURY
NEWS, Dec. 7, 1992, at 1E, available at, 1992 WLNR 1272171.
212.
Id.
213.
Id.
214.
For instance, in Jaramillo,the defendant's Investment Recovery Business division refurbished and resold between $7.5 million and $8.5 million worth of machines. See
Jaramillo v. Weyerhaeuser Corp., 536 F.3d 140, 142 (2d Cir. 2008).
215.
AUTOMOTIVE RECYCLING, YOUR CAR'S AFTERLIFE: A LOOK AT THE AUTOMOTIVE
RECYCLING INDUSTRY

3, http://www.autoalliance.org/index.cfn?objectid=8260C719-1D09-

317F-BB7F895BBDD4563D (last visited Apr. 26, 2010).
216.
TRANSPORTATION TECHNOLOGY R&D CENTER, COSTS OF LITHIUM ION
BATTERIES FOR VEHICLES 11 (2000), http://www.transportation.anl.gov/pdfs/TA/149.pdf.
217.
See Ask Pablo: Time to get a new car?, http://www.triplepundit.com/pages/thisweek-david.php (last visited Apr. 26, 2010) (estimating that a Toyota Prius takes 113.322
mmBTU to manufacture, compared to 107.133 mmBTU for the Toyota Highlander, an

SUV).

218.
Matt Power, Don't Buy That New Prius! Test-Drive a Used CarInstead,WIRED
MAGAZINE, May 19, 2008, http://www.wired.com/science/planetearth/magazine/1606/ff heresies_09usedcars (explaining carbon efficiencies of used cars); see also Posting of
Chuck Squatriglia to Autopia, http://www.wired.corn/autopia/2008/05/the-ultimate-pr/ (May
19, 2008) (explaining additional environmental benefits of used car market).
219.
See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 6985(a)(6) (2000) (authorizing the EPA Administrator to
study "the effect of existing public policies ... upon the recycling and reuse of materials");
CAL. PUB. CON. CODE § 12153 (2007) (declaring recycling as a state policy priority); N.Y.
ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 27-0106 (McKinney 2007); WIS. STAT. § 287.05 (2004).
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for products made with recycled materials.220 In addition, the federal government and several states rely on auctions as a way to sell forfeited or unneeded used-durable goods. 22' These governments resell goods on an "as is,
where is" basis.222
The majority rule recognizes, however, that imposing strict liability on
used-product sellers would "risk destroying one of the few truly free markets left., 223 The Second Restatement depicts used-product sellers only in
quaint examples like a housewife selling a jar of jam or a consumer selling
his used car back to a dealer.22 4 Yet, as shown above, used-product sellers
provide important services for our economy.2 25 At the very least, strict liability would likely force these modem used-good sellers to adopt costly
procedures to avoid selling products likely to cause injuries in the future.226
In response, used-product prices would increase, forcing some marginally
profitable used-product sellers out-of-business. 227 Yet low-income consumers who cannot afford to pay the cost of new goods rely on secondhand
stores to provide them with lower-priced products.22 8 Because expanded
liability might diminish the income balancing effects of used-product markets, low-income consumers and small businesses could disproportionally
suffer from the resulting higher prices for goods.229
On the other hand, the majority rule correctly recognizes the commonsense market reality that consumers expect used-products to be of diminished quality relative to new products.230 In general, consumers of new
goods expect each product to be identical, and accordingly see any variation
See, e.g., N.Y. Dep't of Envtl. Conservation, Buy Recycled!,
220.
http://www.dec.ny.gov/chemical/8499.html (last visited Apr. 26, 2010); U.S. Envtl. Prot.
Agency, Reduce & Reuse, http://www.epa.gov/osw/conserve/rrr/reduce.htm (last visited
Apr. 26, 2010).
221.
See, e.g., GovSales.gov, http://www.govsales.gov/HTML/INDEX.HTM (last
visited Apr. 26, 2010) (federal government's online auction website); eBay My World:
NYSSurplus-Albany, http://myworld.ebay.com/nyssurplus-albany/ (last visited Apr. 26,
2010) (State of New York's online auction website).
222.
See, e.g., N.Y. Office of General Services, State Surplus Personal Property
Sale,
of
Terms
Auction
(last visited
http://www.ogs.state.ny.us/supportServices/stateSurplus/autermsofsale.html
Apr. 26, 2010) (selling all property "as is" and "where is").
223.
King v. Damiron Corp., 113 F.3d 93, 97 (7th Cir. 1997) (quoting Harber v.
Altec Indus., Inc., 812 F. Supp. 954, 965 (W.D. Mo. 1993)).
224.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. f (1965).
See supra notes 204-18 and accompanying text.
225.
Williams, supra note 2, at 276-77.
226.
Frey v. Harley Davidson Motor Co., 734 A.2d 1, 19 (Pa. 1999) (Beck, J., dis227.
senting); Williams, supranote 2, at 276-77.
228.
Choderker, supra note 203, at 430.
dissenting); Nelson v. Nelson Hardware,
Cf Frey, 734 A.2d at 19 (Beck, J.,
229.
Inc., 467 N.W.2d 518, 528-30 (Wis. 1991) (Steinmetz, J., concurring).
See Tillman v. Vance Equip. Co., 596 P.2d 1299, 1304 n.5 (Or. 1979).
230.
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from new condition as signaling imitation, counterfeiting, or some other
flaw that detracts from the consumer's interest in the product.23' Usedproduct buyers likely know that used-products will show signs of wear and
degradation compared to a new product.232 The used-product market exists
precisely so that consumers can willingly trade diminished quality for reduced price.233
The terms of sale for a used-product generally reflect this commonsense understanding. Usually, a seller will explicitly state that the product is
being sold "as is, where is." The minority rule asserts that this disclaimer
has no significance outside of a warranty claim, because the parties are in
such disparate bargaining positions that a seller should not be allowed to
prospectively waive tort liability. 234 In a new product market-where consumers must rely on a retailer or a wholesaler to buy a new product from a
manufacturer-the consumer reasonably expects the whole chain of distribution to be responsible for a defective, injurious product. 235 Yet the entire
used-product market exists so a consumer can willingly choose to give up
expectations in quality and safety in order to get a better price. 236 Thus, the
"as is, where is" disclaimer serves the legitimate interest of letting a consumer know that a product is of reduced price because it is of diminished
quality and safety.237 In turn, consumers have the opportunity to make informed decisions about risk.238
Even the United States Supreme Court has recognized this commonsense market reality in the used-product market. In SaratogaFishing Co. v.
J.M Martinac & Co., 23 9 the plaintiff bought a fifteen-year-old fishing vessel rebuilt and sold by the defendant. 240 The vessel sank because the ship's

231.
Nitro Leisure Products, L.L.C. v. Acushnet Co., 341 F.3d 1356, 1362 (Fed. Cir.
2003) (citing Davidoff & CIE, S.A. v. PLD Intern. Corp. 263 F.3d 1297, 1302 (11th Cir.
2001)).
232.
See id. (citing Champion Spark Plug Co. v. Sanders, 331 U.S. 125, 129 (1947)).
233.
See id.; Choderker, supra note 203, at 430; Desai et al., supra note 195 at 8.
234.
See, e.g., Turner v. Int'l Harvester Co., 336 A.2d 62, 70 (D.C. 1975).
235.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. f(1965).
236.
See, e.g., Peterson v. Idaho First Nat'l Bank, 791 P.2d 1303, 1306 (Idaho 1990);
Tillman v. Vance Equip. Co., 596 P.2d 1299, 1304 n.5 (Or. 1979); cf. Champion Spark Plug
Co. v. Sanders, 331 U.S. 125, 129-30 (1947) ("[I]nferiority is expected in most second-hand
articles. Indeed, they generally cost the consumer less."); see also supra notes 126-28 and
accompanying text.
237.
Tillman, 596 P.2d at 1304.
238.
See Deborah J. La Fetra, Freedom, Responsibility, and Risk: FundamentalPrinciples Supporting Tort Reform, 36 IND. L. REv. 645, 668-75 (2003) (arguing that when individuals have the freedom to make choices and assume responsibility for their choices, they
should be able to consume the level of risk they find personally acceptable).
239.
520 U.S. 875 (1997).
240.
Id. at 877.
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hydraulic system started an engine room fire.2 41 The plaintiff sued the defendant reseller in admiralty, alleging that the hydraulic system's defective
design caused the engine room fire that sank the plaintiffs ship. 42 On admiralty grounds, the court held that the plaintiff could not recover.2 43 In
reaching this holding, the court relied on Tillman to recognize that "it is
likely more difficult for a consumer-a commercial user and reseller-to
offer an appropriate warranty on the used-product he sells akin to a manufacturer's (or distributor's) warranty of the initial product.",244 Because
"[t]he user/reseller did not make (or initially distribute) the product and, to
that extent, he normally would know less about the risks that such a warranty would involve. 245
In short, the "as is, where is" disclaimer befits the durable nature of
used-products. 246 Used-products--especially used-durables-are built to be
consumed over several decades. 247 Moreover, a used-product seller did not
oversee the product's design, manufacture, distribution, or use by several
consumers. 248 Thus, the disclaimer informs the buyer about the unique aspect of a used-product sale-that used-products are of diminished quality
and safety. 249 The majority rule properly recognizes that this market reality
fosters substantial social benefits.2 5 °
241.
Id.
242.
Id.
243.
Id.
244.
Saratoga, 520 U.S. at 882 (citing Tillman v. Vance Equip. Co., 596 P.2d 1299,
1304 (Or. 1979)).
245.
Id. In dissent, Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, argued that liability
should not turn on whether the seller adds additional equipment to the product uses that
product before selling it. Id. at 887-88 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Instead, Justice Scalia argued
that the Court should adopt the "last-402A-seller rule," where the definition of a "product"
would be fixed by the last person in the chain of distribution who is "engaged in the business
of selling such a product." Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965)).
Justice O'Connor also joined in Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion, but wrote separately to
argue that certiorari should not have been granted in the case. Id at 885 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
246.
See id.; see also Torrington Indus., Inc. v. Southworth-Milton, Inc., 793
N.Y.S.2d 613 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005). Indeed, an "as is" disclaimer is effective for a seller to
prospectively waive warranty liability. U.C.C § 2-316 (1977). In some cases, it may even be
acceptable to waive negligence liability. See, e.g., New Texas Auto Auction Servs., L.P. v.
Gomez De Hernandez, 249 S.W.3d 400, 407 (Tex. 2008) ("Generally, those who buy a
product 'as is' accept the risk of potential defects, and thus cannot claim a seller's negligence caused their injures.").
247.
See Desai et al., supra note 195, at 8.
248.
Cf Saratoga,520 U.S. at 882.
249.
See Tillman v. Vance Equip. Co., 596 P.2d 1299. 1303 (Or. 1979) ("If a buyer
wants some assurance of quality, he typically either bargains for it in the specific transaction
or seeks out a dealer who routinely offers it .... ").
250.
Id. at 1303-04 ("The flexibility of this kind of market appears to serve legitimate
interests of buyers as well as sellers.").
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ONLY A THRIVING USED-PRODUCT MARKET WILL DETER THE SPREAD
OF DANGEROUS GOODS

The minority rule assumes that strict liability is the most effective
means to deter the spread of dangerous products. 251 Yet the used-product
market itself creates market incentives to deter the spread of dangerous
products. In particular, the used-product market mitigates the effects of
"information asymmetry." Information asymmetry occurs in markets where
one party, usually the seller, has more and better information about a product than the buyer does.2 52 A consumer who lacks enough information to
evaluate product quality may not be able to determine whether a particular
product has a hidden defect. 253 As shown in Nobel Prize-winning research,
information asymmetry hinders efficiency because it puts consumers at a
disadvantage in choosing quality products.254
Used-goods sellers may counteract the harmful effects of information
asymmetry. 211 Used-goods markets make a seller's reputation a proxy for
product quality. 256 Used-product sellers reputed for quality will prosper,
whereas used-product sellers not reputed for quality will fail.257 By creating
a market incentive to sell quality used-products, the used-product market
helps counteract the negative effects of information asymmetry and, therefore, increases the likelihood that consumers will buy quality usedproducts.258

251.
See Gonzalez v. Rutherford Corp., 881 F. Supp. 829, 842 (E.D.N.Y. 1995).
252.
Mann & Holdych, supra note 194, at 2.
253.
Id.
254.
See, e.g., George A. Akerlof, et al., The Marketfor "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 1970 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970) (studying information
asymmetry in used car market).
255.
See Eric W. Bond, Test of the Lemons Model: Reply, 74 AM. ECON. REv. 801,
804 (1984); see also David Genesove, Adverse Selection in the Wholesale Used Car Market,
101 J. POL. ECON. 644 (1993) (explaining the values of used car auctions in providing "stock
management" for dealers which helps them manage retail needs and, in turn, provides a
market based on a relationship between desired quality and price instead of "taking advantage of bidders' ignorance"); Thomas W. Gilligan, Lemons and Leases in the Used Business
Aircraft Market (2003), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=-398360 (finding a direct relationship between depreciation and trading volume for used aircraft models with relatively
high lease rates; suggests that the presence of proxies for aircraft quality reduce adverse
selection).
256.
See supra note 255.
257.
See supra note 255.
258.
See Anindya Ghose, Internet Exchanges for Used Goods: An EmpiricalAnalysis
of
Trade Patterns and Adverse
Selection (2008),
available at
http://ssm.com/abstract=-1214725 (emphasizing the importance of easy access to branding
and reputation as a means of reducing information asymmetry and adverse selection in internet used good markets).
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Structural market differences keep strict liability from achieving risk
deterrence in the used-product market. When selling new products, manufacturers reach consumers indirectly through a system of wholesalers, retailers, and other intermediaries. 25 9 Because their behavior is coordinated,
each decision similarly affects all other actors within the same chain. 6 °
Accordingly, strict liability for new-product sellers achieves risk deterrence
because a strict liability judgment against one actor will affect all other actors in the same sales chain. 61 Moreover, intermediaries rarely pay for a
products liability judgment. Instead, in about ninety-five percent of cases,
intermediaries indemnify or seek contribution from the manufacturer that
made the defective product.262 As a result, a products liability judgment for
the manufacturer to improve
a defective new product will directly pressure 263
liability.
future
avoid
to
order
in
safety
product
Yet no such coordination exists in the used-product market. A usedproduct may be sold and resold decades after the manufacturer went out-ofbusiness. 264 Unlike the intermediaries in the new-product market-which
generally cooperate with manufacturers-manufacturers compete against
used-product sellers for the same consumers. 65 Because of this competition, manufacturers do not have the same economic incentive to communicate safety information to used-product sellers.266 Therefore, either because
of lack of opportunity or lack of economic incentive, there is usually no
ready channel of communication between the manufacturer and usedproduct sellers.267
In fact, strict liability could increase the amount of dangerous and defective used-products sold. By increasing the cost and risk associated with
selling used goods, strict liability could force some marginally-profitable
used-product sellers out of business. 2 68 A shrunken used-product market
would also reduce that market's inherent protections against information

259.
See Desai et al., supra n. 195, at 8.
260.
See id.
261.
Cf RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. c (1965).
262.
Victor E. Schwartz & Mark A. Behrens, The Road to FederalProductsLiability
Reform, 55 MD. L. REv. 1363, 1370 (1996).
See Desai et al., supra note 195, at 8.
263.
264.
See, e.g., Jaramillo v. Weyerhaeuser Corp., 536 F.3d 140, 147 (2d Cir. 2008)
(punch press that injured a plaintiff sold twenty-two years after its manufacture, and two
years after the manufacturer went out of business); Tillman v. Vance Equip. Co., 596 P.2d
1299, 1300 (Or. 1979) (involving a twenty-four-year-old used crane).
See Tillman, 596 P.2d at 1304; Desai et al., supra note 195, at 8.
265.
See Tillman, 596 P.2d at 1304.
266.
See id.
267.
268.
Cf Frey v. Harley Davidson Motor Co., 734 A.2d 1, 19 (Pa. 1999) (Beck, J.,
dissenting); Williams, supra note 2, at 277.
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asymmetry.2 69 With nowhere else to go for affordable goods, low-income
consumers might turn to non-commercial or underground markets for used
goods. 27 0 Non-commercial used-product sellers, however, are likely to resell defective used-products as regular sellers of used goods because they
have no incentive to maintain a long-term reputation for selling quality
goods. 271 Strict liability could remove these market-based protections for
consumers. If lower prices drove consumers into underground markets for
used-products, that could diminish overall consumer protection because
such underground sellers may not be liable for willful, or even negligent,
sale or distribution of a defective used-product. In the alternative, because
they are unable to afford a new replacement, consumers might keep using
outdated durable goods long after their useful life has ended.27 2 Low income purchasers would disproportionately suffer, despite their desire to
trade some modem safety features for a reasonably safe used good at a
lower price.273 When consumers cannot afford a high-priced new good, they
be able to buy a reasonably safe used good instead of nothing at
should
2 74
all.
Whether or not strict liability is expanded, negligence remains a viable
claim against a used-product seller. 275 Even if a buyer should not expect a
used-product to be in the same condition as if it were sold new, the buyer
could reasonably expect the used-product seller will exercise reasonable
care. 276 By basing liability on fault, the negligence doctrine encourages sellers to take reasonable steps to reduce their buyers' risks of harm.277 While
the evidentiary problems of negligence may still keep a plaintiff from
bringing an otherwise valid claim, negligence would cover some of the
most common fact situations where a seller would fall below the standard
of care.278 A seller also could negligently fail to eliminate a defect in in269. See Bond, supra note 255, at 804.
270. See Rose v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 53 A.D.3d 80 (2008) (noting
that imposition of tort liability can act as a virtual ban on a product, thus inviting consumers
to obtain the product through other channels, including the black market).
Bond, supra note 255, at 804; Williams, supra note 2, at 277.
271.
272. See Michael I. Krauss, Restoring the Boundary: Tort Law and the Right to Contract, 347 CATO INST. POL'Y ANALYSIS 11 (June 3, 1999); Mann & Holdych, supra note 194,
at 39.
273. See Tillman v. Vance Equip. Co., 596 P.2d 1299, 1304 (Or. 1979).
274. La Fetra, supra note 238, at 664-65.
275. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 8 (1997).
276. Id. cmt. b, e.
277. Id.
278. See id. cmt. e (recognizing that negligence liability under the Third Restatement
would be available against "[a] commercial used-product seller who negligently introduces a
defect or fails to eliminate a defect in performing such tasks as inspecting, repairing, modifying, rebuilding, redesigning, or reconditioning a used product, or a seller who negligently
fails to provide adequate warnings").
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specting, repairing, modifying, rebuilding, redesigning, or reconditioning a
used-product.279 In some circumstances, a seller may
280 also negligently fail to
product.
the
in
defect
known
a
of
plaintiff
the
warn
For these reasons, imposing strict products liability on used-product
sellers would not advance the goal of risk deterrence. In view of the "increased complexity of modem products and modem production methods,"
most often only the manufacturer knows when a product is safely designed
for its intended purpose. 28 1 The majority rule correctly recognizes that consumers do not expect such knowledge from a used-good seller, and willingly trade that diminished knowledge for a reduction in price.282 Furthermore, a used-good seller usually has no opportunity or incentive to convey
product improvement information to the seller.283 For that reason, the majority rule best accomplishes the goal of risk deterrence because it lets the
market-based incentive for product quality keep defective products out of
the marketplace.284
C.

TRADITIONAL PRODUCTS LIABILITY CLAIMS FAIRLY COMPENSATE
CONSUMERS INJURED BY USED-PRODUCTS

Although expanded strict liability would, by definition, more easily
compensate consumers injured by products, the majority rule prevents strict
liability from becoming absolute liability because it properly holds a usedgoods seller liable where the seller created the defect that injured the consumer. 285 Accordingly, the majority of courts have properly recognized that
ease of compensation alone should not justify strict liability. 286 A defendant

279.
See id.
280.
See id.; see also id. illus. 7 (applying reasonable care standard to illustration
where used-product seller negligently repairs an electric generator for commercial resale).
281.
Suklijan v. Charles Ross & Son, Co., 503 N.E.2d 1358, 1360 (N.Y. 1986).
282.
See, e.g., Saratoga Fishing Co. v. J.M. Martinac & Co., 520 U.S. 875, 882
(1997); Peterson v. Idaho First Nat'l Bank, 791 P.2d 1303, 1306 (Idaho 1990); Tillman v.
Vance Equip. Co., 596 P.2d 1299, 1304 (Or. 1979).
283.
See Humes, supra note 2, at 401.
284.
See Tillman, 596 P.2d at 1303-04.
285.
Allenberg v. Bentley Hedges Travel Serv., Inc., 22 P.3d 223, 231 (Okla. 2001);
see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 8 (1997).
286.
See, e.g., Antone v. Greater Ariz. Auto Auction, Inc., 155 P.3d 1074, 1078
(Ariz. App. 2007); Grimes v. Axtell Ford Lincoln-Mercury, 403 N.W.2d 781, 785 (Iowa
1987); Tillman, 596 P.2d at 1304 (recognizing that compensation alone should not justify
strict products liability); see also Gary T. Schwartz, The Beginning and the PossibleEnd of
the Rise of Modern American Tort Law, 26 GA. L. REv. 601, 640 (1992) ("[J]udges have
intuited the fact that loss distribution standing alone does not provide an acceptable or legitimate basis for tort liability.").
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position to bear the burden of an
company will almost always be in a better287
accidental injury than the injured plaintiff.
Instead, courts should examine the relative hardships of strict liability. 288 While it is undisputed that injured consumers have a strong interest in
compensation, imposing strict liability on used-product sellers would likely
make the seller of used products pay for harms caused by latent defects that
he did not create and that he could not discover in the exercise of reasonable care. 289 Especially given the durability of used-products, a usedproduct seller may never even have the opportunity to fix a defective product. No matter how much care a used-product seller exercises in inspecting
used-products before sale, the minority rule holds him strictly liable for the
mere sale of a used-product.29 °
Even though the minority rule assumes that used-product sellers would
be able to insure against products liability judgments,29 1 there are serious
problems to maintain a viable insurance system for the sale of a defective
used-product. 292 To fairly insure product sellers against enterprise-liability
products-liability claims, three underlying conditions must be satisfied.293
First, the boundaries of those businesses subject to enterprise liability must
be fairly and clearly demarcated, so that covered businesses are evenhandedly selected for fair exposure to liability.294 Second, workable causation triggers must be present to identify valid claims.2 95 This means maintaining the common law concepts of actual and proximate causation as a
limiting principle to weed out invalid claims.296 Finally, the insurance system must avoid the problems of adverse selection and moral hazard.297 Adverse selection occurs when high-risk insureds pay premiums that do not
adequately reflect their high-risk status and are therefore undercharged rela287.
See Antone, 155 P.3d at 1078.
288.
See Coase, supra note 66, at 43.
289.
See Cataldo v. Lazy Days R.V. Ctr. Inc, 920 So. 2d 174, 178 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2006) (citing Masker v. Smith, 405 So. 2d 432 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981)); Peterson v. Lou
Bachrodt Chevrolet Co., 329 N.E.2d 785, 787 (111.1975).
290.
See, e.g., Turner v. Int'l Harvester Co., 336 A.2d 62, 69 (N.J. Super. Law Div.
1975).
291.
See, e.g., id.
Cf Nelson v. Nelson Hardware, Inc., 467 N.W.2d 518, 528 n.4 (Wis. 1991)
292.
(Steinmetz, J., concurring) (discussing insurance issues in urging the court to limit strict
liability for used-product sellers).
293.
See James A. Henderson, Echoes of EnterpriseLiability in Product Design and
Marketing Litigation, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 958, 962 (2002) (explaining the concepts of
adverse selection and moral hazard).
Id. at 962-63.
294.
Id. at 963.
295.
296.
Id.
297.
Id.
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tive to lower-risk insureds.298 The related concept of moral hazard refers to
the "natural tendency for insureds, unless prevented by the relevant terms of
coverage, to increase their risks of incurring covered losses by conduct engaged in after the insurance arrangements take effect., 299 Teetering between
these interrelated problems, insurance providers must be able to ascertain
risks at the time they arise-to prevent moral hazard-while linking insurance premiums to appropriate risk level so that lower-risk insureds do not
leave the insurance pool that is overcharging them-to avoid adverse selection.3 00
In the new-products market, the requirement that a manufacturing defect be present at the time that it leaves a manufacturer's possession creates
a bright-line limit on liability. 30 1 Given the coordinated chain of wholesalers
and manufacturers necessary for a new-product seller to sell his product to a
consumer, that bright-line is also fair.30 2 By contrast, the "regular" versus
"occasional" seller rule-section 402A's dividing line for used good sellers' liability-is murky at best. 3° 3 In addition, it unfairly includes many
sellers who neither created the
product defect nor could have encouraged
3 °4
the product to be built safely.
Section 402A also creates significant problems with adverse selection
and moral hazard. Section 402A does not cover "occasional" used-product
sellers.30 5 Strict liability might induce consumers to buy from occasional
used-product sellers, who need not carry insurance because they will not be
subject to the increased costs of inspection and repair.30 6 Yet occasional
used-product sellers may be more likely to sell dangerous products.30 7 Nor
do occasional used-product sellers need to build a reputation for quality,
because they will not be continually selling products in the marketplaceso, they may not counteract information asymmetries about product qualHenderson, supra note 293, at 964.
298.
299.
Id.at 965.
300.
Id.at 964.
301.
See id.
at 964-65.
302.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. c (1965).
303.
See, e.g., Galindo v. Precision Am. Corp., 754 F.2d 1212, 1217 (5th Cir. 1985).
304.
See Cataldo v. Lazy Days R.V. Ctr., 920 So. 2d 174, 178 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2006) (citing Masker v. Smith, 405 So. 2d 432 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981)); Peterson v. Lou
Bachrodt Chevrolet Co., 329 N.E.2d 785, 787 (I11.
1975).
305.
Galindo, 754 F.2d at 1219 (finding that section 402A intended to exempt occasional sellers from strict liability).
306.
See James A. Henderson, Why Negligence Dominates Tort, 50 UCLA L. REV.
377, 399 (2002) ("[P]roduct consumers could alter their general patterns of purchase, use,
and consumption so as to take advantage of the flat-rate characteristics of insurance pricing.
."); Humes, supra note 2, at 400-02.
307.
See Nelson v. Nelson Hardware, Inc., 467 N.W.2d 518, 529-30 (Wis. 1991)
(Steinmetz, J., concurring); see also Peter Huber, LIABtLITY: THE LEGAL REVOLuTION AND
rrs CONSEQUENCES 163-65 (1988).
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ity. 30 8 And even if defenses like contributory fault, product misuse, and
others were available to defendants,3 °9 section 402A creates a moral hazard
because it would make a used-product seller responsible for the myriad
post-distribution uses and modes of consumption, which would dramatically affect the seller's exposure to liability.31 0 Unable to afford the premiums for insurance against selling a defective used product, many usedproduct sellers may operate without insurance. 3 11 Without insurance or
enough assets to pay damages, a strict liability judgment may result in driving those sellers
out of business, leaving the accident victim without any
312
compensation.
Moreover, the injured consumer may already be able to recover under
an alternative theory. Even if strict liability is unavailable, plaintiffs can
still bring negligence, warranty, and misrepresentation claims against usedproduct sellers. 31 3 In the common situation where defective machinery
causes a work-related injury, the Worker's Compensation system already
exists for compensating workers for on-the-job injuries. 314 Many courts
have stressed, however, that Worker's Compensation is the exclusive remedy for work-related injuries. 31 5 Permitting a double-recovery could lead to
inconsistent with the efficient risk-deterrence
over-deterrence, which is 316
rationale for strict liability.
On balance, fairness suggests limited strict liability for used-product
sellers. Even without strict liability, consumers may be able to maintain
negligence and warranty actions against used-product sellers. In the usedproduct seller context, these traditional products liability claims have the
added benefit of encouraging used-product sellers to exercise reasonable
care in selling used products.3 17 The majority rule recognizes that usedproduct sellers are not well situated to bear the cost of insuring the items
that they sell.31 8 In imposing a social insurance system by law, the minority
See Bond, supra note 255, at 804.
308.
See generally 2 OwEN, supra note 4, §§ 14-16.
309.
See Henderson, supra note 306, at 401.
310.
311.
See Humes, supra note 2, at 407.
312. See Richard C. Ausness, An Insurance-Based Compensation System for Product-RelatedInjuries, 58 U. PirI. L. REV. 669, 684-88 (1997).
313. See, e.g., 1 OWEN, supra note 4, § 1:5.
314. See Ausness, supra note 312, at 706-08.
315. See, e.g., Camargo v. Tjaarda Dairy, 25 P.3d 1096, 1102 (Cal. 2001); McDonald
v. Employers' Liab. Assurance Corp., 192 N.E. 608, 609 (Mass. 1934) (recognizing that an
underlying principle of Worker's Compensation is that "there shall not be double recovery
for injury-once by way of compensation and once by way of damages").
316.
Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., Deterrence: The Legitimate Function of the Public
Tort, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1019, 1044 (2001); see also Goodwin, supra note 2, at 54143, Humes, supra note 2, at 393-95.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 8 cmt. b (1997).
317.
See, e.g., Harber v. Altec Indus. Inc., 812 F. Supp. 954, 965 (W.D. Mo. 1993).
318.
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rule gives courts a difficult standard to apply, and potentially creates issues
of adverse selection and moral hazard that prevent insurers from charging
used-product sellers affordable premiums.319 Moreover, overbroad strict
liability would reduce the important social benefits of the used-product
markets.320 In general, injured consumers will already be able to recover
under negligence, warranty, misrepresentation, or Worker's Compensation
claims.3 2 1 Therefore, fairness is maximized through a limited strict liability
system.
D.

THE MAJORITY RULE DEFERS TO STATE LEGISLATURES, WHICH CAN
PROPERLY WEIGH THE COMPETING PUBLIC POLICIES OF STRICT
LIABILITY

Legislatures-not courts-are best equipped to weigh the competing
public policy concerns of strict liability. The scope of strict liability depends on the policies of enterprise liability, efficiency, risk spreading, risk
deterrence, compensation, and fairness.3 22 Many courts have recognized
that these are inherently issues of public policy. 323 As a result, they should
be committed to the state legislature, which can adequately consider the
broader policy issues that have confounded courts.324 Most state legislatures
have passed laws limiting the scope of strict liability to non-manufacturer
sellers. 325 Five state statutes exempt a product seller from liability if the
seller did not have knowledge of the defect.326 Six more states specifically
exclude sellers from being held liable simply because they are within the
chain of distribution, absent some extenuating circumstance.327 In three
states, a plaintiff must file an affidavit certifying the correct identity of the
See Henderson, supra note 306, at 400-01 (2002) (recognizing that these prob319.
lems of insurance, among other problems, have prevented strict liability principles from
overtaking the influence of negligence law in tort).
See supra notes 204-18 and accompanying text.
320.
321.
See supra notes 312-16 and accompanying text.
See Goodwin, supra note 2, at 536-45; Humes, supra note 2, at 384-96.
322.
See, e.g., Suklijan v. Charles Ross & Son Co., 503 N.E.2d 1358, 1360-61 (N.Y.
323.
1986).
324.
See, e.g., id.
325.
See AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 5:14-5:17 (2008); Robert A.
Sachs, Product Liability Reform and Seller Liability: A Proposalfor Change, 55 BAYLOR L.
REv. 1031 app. (2003).
326.
See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 613.18(1)(a) (1999); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3306
(2005); MICH. CoMP. LAWS § 600.2947(6) (2000); N.J. REv. STAT. § 2A:58C-11 (1994);
TEx. Crv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 82.003 (Vernon 2005); WASH. REv. CODE § 7.72.040
(2007).
327.
See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-402 (2005); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-11l(b)(1) (2000); MISS. CODE. ANN. § 11-1-64(1) (2002); Mo. REv. STAT. § 537.762 (2008);
NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-21,181 (2008); S.D. CODIFED LAWS § 20-9-9 (2004); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 29-28-106(b) (2000).
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manufacturer of the product that allegedly injured the consumer in order to
proceed.328
Many states also limit liability outside of the initial chain of distribution, depending on the product market involved.329 Some states limit the
products liability responsibility of new motor vehicle dealers to the delivery
and preparation obligations specified by the manufacturer.
New Jersey
limits liability for resale by public entities, 331 and Ohio and Oregon limit
the liability of good-faith donors of general merchandise to non-profit sell33 2
ers.
Thus, most of the state legislatures to reach this issue have found ways
to limit, not expand strict liability. Indeed, four states' legislaturesKansas, New Jersey, Texas, and Washington-have adopted limits on strict
liability despite courts that have applied strict liability to used-product sellers.333 No statute, however, has singled out used-product sellers for unique
treatment. For that reason, like much of the underlying law of strict liability, it is likely that the drafters of these statutes did not consider the issue of
used-product sellers. Most significantly, no state has adopted the kind of
worker's compensation system or no-fault insurance system urged by so
many commentators.33 4 As a result, these state legislatures' balancing of
public policy considerations suggests what the Third Restatement drafters
have already concluded that a used-product seller is fairly held liable-on
fairness and efficiency grounds-only where its negligence causes harm.335

328. See, e.g., 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/2-621 (2008); MINN. STAT. § 544.41 (2000);
Mo. REV. STAT. § 537.762 (2008); N.J. REV. STAT. § 2A:58C-9 (West 1994); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 28-01.3-04(1) (2006).
329.
AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 5:17 (2008).
330. See, e.g., ARK, CODE ANN. § 23-112-310(c) (2004); CAL. VEH. CODE § 3064(a)
(West 2000); IDAHO CODE § 49-1622 (2008); 625 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-103(a) (2008); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1175 (2009); MINN. STAT. § 80E.04(5) (2009); MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 61-4-204(4) (2008); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4517.53(A) (West 2008); PA. STAT. ANN. 63
§ 818.9(a) (West 2010); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 31-5.1-5 (2002); S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-15-50
(2006); WIs. STAT. § 218.0125(2) (2009).
331.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:9-2(b) (West 2006).
332.
OHIO REV. CODE § 2305.37(C) (2001); OR. REV. STAT. § 30.892 (2003).
333. See, e.g., Galindo v. Precision Am. Corp., 754 F.2d 1212 (5th Cir. 1985); Stile
v. AM Int'l, Inc., 850 F. Supp. 960 (D. Kan. 1994); Turner v. Int'l Harvester Co., 336 A.2d
62 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1975); Hovenden v. Tenbush, 529 S.W.2d 302 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975);
Thompson v. Rockford Mach. Tool, 744 P.2d 357 (Wash. App. Div. 1987).
334. See Williams, supra note 2, at 281-84; Henderson, supra note 306, at nn. 36-37
(discussing further commentary that has suggested broad statutory enterprise liability systems).
335. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LAB. § 8 cmt. b, e (1997).
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CONCLUSION

With a better understanding of strict liability's effects in the real
world, courts can finally resolve the lingering debate over the imposition of
strict liability on used-goods sellers. Everyday used-product sellers--e.g.,
used-car dealers, public and private auctioneers, Goodwill and Salvation
Army stores, and countless others-serve an essential role in our economy.
They encourage an efficient marketplace by addressing the problems of
information asymmetry and income inequality. As a result, they let lowincome consumers buy affordable, quality goods, and create a market incentive for sellers to build a reputation for quality in the marketplace. Although strict liability might let injured consumers recover more easily, the
minority rule fails to recognize that strict liability would curtail the legitimate social and economic benefits that used-product sellers provide. Instead, the minority rule imposes a framework designed for new-product
sellers on the uniquely structured used-product market, which cannot bear
the burdens of enterprise liability like new-product sellers can. For that reason, imposing strict liability on used-product sellers is unfair, especially
where there are alternative means of compensation for injured consumers in
most cases. Even though strict liability involves competing public policies,
both courts and legislatures should follow the majority rule and properly
limit strict liability to the new-product context because of the important
economic and social benefits created by used-product sellers.

